METAMELEIA AND FRIENDS: REMORSE AND REPENTANCE IN FIFTH- AND FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN ORATORY

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DESPITE A BURGEONING INTEREST IN THE PASSIONS IN ANTIQUITY, certain of the emotions remain underexplored. This article, following precedents set by K. J. Dover for the use of the orators to discover "popular morality,"[1] will attempt to broaden the discussion about the emotion designated by the Greeks as *metameleia*. This emotion, which I will provisionally call "remorse" or "repentance," has been neglected for what seem to be three reasons.[2] The first derives from an only recently discarded belief that the Greeks, as participants in a "shame-culture," did not feel emotions like remorse, but were solely motivated in their actions by considerations of utility and external display (i.e., they were concerned with possible punishment rather than ethics).[3] Although there remains profitable discussion of the ways in which shame-cultures and guilt-cultures might differ, and there is clearly some truth in the sentiment I have put so baldly about ancient Greeks and shame, there is no longer a belief that it was impossible for an Athenian to feel something like repentance.[4]

A second reason for the neglect of remorse, as Cairns and Konstan note, is that the places modern parallels might lead us to look for it, namely Athenian forensic speeches, yield poor results.[5] In modern criminal cases, offenders can plea-bargain

[1] Dover (1974) discusses his methodology at 8–9 and at 13 suggests a number of reasons why oratory is useful as an index of popular morality.

[2] While there are, I think, subtle differences between the two terms, I will here use them interchangeably both because it is not clear that Greek distinguishes between them and because English linguistic usage is not always careful about the distinctions.

[3] So, for instance, Dover's otherwise useful (1974) study does not sufficiently distinguish between altruistic and self-interested motives in his discussion of "conscience." At 225, he notes that Eur. *Or.* 301–310 "does not pretend" that "conscience and repentance *alone* constitute his suffering"; Dover sees this as characteristic of a kind of double motivation: something is both morally wrong and inexpedient.

[4] My hope is that Cairns's (1993: 45–47 and *passim*) thorough discussion of the decreasing usefulness of the distinction between shame-based societies and guilt-based societies will remove most doubts about the existence of what we would call "ethical emotions" like remorse in the ancient world. Although it is not the intention of this piece to argue further for the abandonment of the terms, some of what is here presented could certainly be used to do so. Among many examples in the orators alone, Isocrates' admonition to Demonicus that he should avoid injustice because he will know about his own shameful (*aischron*) acts even if they escape the notice of others (1.16–17) will serve to point up the inadequacy of the distinction between shame (i.e., external sanctions) and guilt (i.e., internal sanctions). See too Hunter 1994 on internal and external methods of social control, particularly chapter 4 on the role of gossip in social regulation. Adkins (1970: 29–31, 42, and *passim*) usefully suggests "results-culture" as a more important delineation.

[5] Cairns 1999: 176 is useful for the entirety of this paragraph. He also notes that the orators regularly warn judges about feeling remorse over poor judicial decisions (177), an issue this article will address.

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(a way of expressing remorse before the trial begins) or express remorse during the sentencing phase of the trial to receive lighter sentences. This first option differs from what we know of ancient trials, and our surviving evidence about the ancient parallel to the second, the *timesis* speech, is slim; there may well have been significant similarities between ancient and modern practice in this respect.[6] But the fact that remorse seems to play little role in sentencing does not mean that *metameleia* is unimportant to the orators. Indeed, as I shall argue, it illustrates the ways in which they attempt to manipulate public opinion to serve their own ends. More broadly, the oratorical use of *metameleia* provides evidence that the mental state of an agent—both during and after an act—mattered to the Athenians, as it does to us.[7]

The final reason for the dearth of work on *metameleia* is, I think, that it is surprisingly easy to overlook, being often subsumed by other emotions. *Metameleia* was undertheorized in antiquity, as remorse is in the modern world.[8] My suspicion is that this comparative neglect may derive, in part, from its popular association with crime, and therefore, aberrant rather than normative behavior. There is a vast scholarly literature on related emotions such as anger, shame, guilt, and even regret (emotions that seem to be accepted as more or less normal, regardless of their desirability); by contrast, nearly everything written about remorse falls into the disciplines of jurisprudence or clinical psychology.[9] Similarly, repentance, which has, rightly or wrongly, assumed a Christian flavor, is generally seen as being in the bailiwick of theologians. So too among ancient sources there is little explicit discussion of the role of remorse: Greek poets portray remorseful agents, but rarely in consistent ways, and ancient historians sometimes suggest remorse as a motivating factor for a decision or event, but rarely discuss this in detail.

At the same time, despite their relative unpopularity, remorse and repentance play a key role in our notions of morality. Remorse is not a pleasurable emotion to feel, but this by itself does not explain its neglect; a variety of other unpleasing

[6] Thanks to Edward M. Harris for drawing my attention to the *timesis*. On our only extant *timesis* speech, Plato's *Apology* 36–38e, see below, 249. Aeschines (1.113) suggests that Timarchus freely admitted his guilt during a previous trial for embezzlement, and prematurely argued for a light sentence. In point of fact, because of his confession, his fine was set at half that of the others found guilty, which suggests that remorse may have played a larger role in sentencing than our evidence suggests. See Konstan 2001: 27–48 on the place of remorse in modern courtrooms and its use before the sentencing phase, and Konstan 2000 on the role of pity in oratory.

[7] On the role of the mental element in Athenian law, see Maschke 1926.

[8] Although Aristotle discusses *metameleia*, it is not mentioned by him as one of the *pathemata*, probably because of its complexity; it is not simply an emotion but also contains a public element.

[9] So, for instance, the single scholarly book on remorse (Cox 1999) appears in a series entitled "Forensic Focus." This neglect is particularly acute in comparison to the vast bibliography on shame and guilt, two emotions related to remorse and perceived by their theorists as the keys to understanding human development, sexual dysfunction, religion, and a host of other central characteristics of human civilization. On shame and guilt, see Taylor 1985; Tangney and Dearing 2002. The standard discussion of the differences between the two is found in Piers and Singer 1971.

emotions are valorized. Furthermore, it is not clear whether remorse and repentance *are* bad. In an ideal world, nobody would feel remorse because nobody would do anything wrong. But given that people do wrong, it is better for them to feel repentance than not; those who do not we tend to call sociopaths and isolate from society. We want others to feel remorse when it is appropriate, and it could be argued that we even want ourselves to feel remorse when we deserve it—despite its unpleasantness. This prescriptiveness or appropriateness is more pronounced in remorse than in other kinds of emotions: I may differentiate between reasonable and unreasonable sadness, but I am less likely to form a judgment about the moral character of someone who "should" feel sad in a given situation and does not, or who feels what I consider to be excessive sadness.[10] Another way to say this is that the emotions of repentance and remorse presume a community with shared values; individuals without remorse or repentance raise the disturbing question of whether those communal values are truly communal. This explains why we tend to view unremorseful murderers as deserving of greater punishment than those who express remorse: by the act of murder, they have demonstrated that they are not a part of "our" community (which does not condone murder), and repentance is their signal that they would now like to (re-)join us. The rupture of community itself is arguably viewed as the greater crime. It is in this sense in particular—its connection to a community—that remorse is a more complicated notion than shame or guilt (see below, section 1).

Emotions, both ancient and modern, are complex. An emotion like remorse is especially complex because of its communicative role. Indeed, in any given context, it may be impossible to decide whether remorse is present in an offender, or, more importantly given the useful social functions of remorse, to distinguish between true and feigned remorse. In what follows, therefore, I do not make any claims about whether various agents did indeed feel remorse for their actions. Far more important for understanding remorse is determining when it can reasonably be attributed to someone, and when it can plausibly be discounted.

This article will address only a piece of the puzzle posed by remorse. Specifically, it will discuss how *metameleia* and words similar to it can illustrate both Athenian morality and the techniques used by fifth- and fourth-century orators to lead their audiences to draw certain conclusions.[11] A secondary aim is to argue for more precise translation of the Greek emotion-words related to the reconsideration of an action.

The oratorical corpus is comprised of speeches that aim to influence their hearers to make certain decisions; in the case of forensic oratory, those decisions are ideally based on the facts of the case, as well as any relevant laws, but also

[10] Aristotle believed that most emotions were susceptible of judgments of this kind; see especially *NE* 2.7 on those who are overly angry or, on the contrary, overly insensitive to their own honor. We, on the other hand, tend to distinguish between ethical and non-ethical emotions.

[11] This article is an early part of a much larger project, examining ancient attitudes toward remorse and, more broadly, reconsideration of past action.

on community norms and justice.[12] I will argue that *metameleia* serves in forensic oratory to distance the object of the speaker's attack from the speaker and from the dikasts (conceived of as a unitary moral force). It also, in deliberative oratory, acts as a check on the Athenian people itself. In both cases, it is used as a tool to manipulate the audience into finding certain propositions repugnant and their opposites desirable.

I

We begin with a working definition of remorse and then outline the parameters of *metameleia*; the two will be compared in the final section. Remorse is the emotion one has after having done something felt to be bad (or, sometimes, not having done something good) that one now wishes not to have done (or to have done); it is unpleasant to feel.[13] Remorse has much in common with how the doing of an evil deed affects oneself or one's self-perception (i.e., with shame and guilt).[14] The primary difference between the three is that remorse combines this inner recognition of a wrong with a focus on its effect on another. Because of this, where possible, the agent will most often try to undo his/her act; shame and guilt only infrequently spur one to reparative action. But remorse is generally felt for offenses perceived as serious and often irreparable. Where reparation is possible, it tends to mitigate or put an end to feelings of remorse. Remorse also necessitates the acceptance of responsibility for an action, even if the action was unintentional or done without full knowledge of consequences. The social function of remorse is both to indicate that someone has transgressed the boundaries of community and to affirm the values of that community; those without remorse have, in a sense, removed themselves from the social contract.

The terms remorse and regret are often used interchangeably, so it is necessary to draw a few distinctions between them for the purpose of clarity. Regret shares with remorse its retrospectiveness and, usually, the immutability of the regretted thing, but is a far more general emotion. Regret, for instance, can be felt over something for which one assumes no responsibility (e.g., the passing of summer), and also for something that is not serious (as in the standard "decline with regret" of invitations). But like remorse, regret can be longterm and painful, even without a belief in one's own responsibility. Where the two are most similar, the significant difference is in focus—true remorse looks beyond the self to the larger world, while regret simply wishes things were different.

[12] Christ (1998: 40–42) notes a focus on extralegal considerations in the orators—most often concentrating on issues of character (including liturgies performed or avoided), but also on the good of the city as a whole. These "external" factors may well have played a significant role in judicial decisions.

[13] Thalberg (1963: 546) offers a standard definition of remorse; our definitions differ only in that he believes remorse to have no necessary connection to reparation.

[14] On Greek shame (*aischune*), see now Konstan 2003a: esp. 1043–44 on the differences between ancient and modern shame.

There are a number of Greek words that share in the semantic field of *metameleia* (verb *metamelei*),[15] and they will be treated as they occur in the passages discussed; significantly, they are primarily verbs: *metanoeo* (reconsider, literally "after-think"), *metagignosko* (change one's mind, "after-know"), and *metabouleuo* (change one's mind or "after-plan").[16] These words, however, are used by the orators in slightly different ways from *metameleia*, as we shall see in section IV, where it is suggested that *metameleia* alone always contains a moral component. Repentance can of course be expressed without any of these words; the phrase "he has done this terrible thing, which he now feels very badly about and is trying to fix" is an apt if unsophisticated description of remorse. In oratory, however, remorse-like feelings are most often denoted by the lexical markers cited above.[17]

II

Metameleia in the orators is characterized more by absence than presence, and a lack of *metameleia* is most often used to show the deliberate intent of the agent, and consequently his or her full guilt; corollary to this notion seems to be the suggestion that the agent therefore deserves no pity. In other circumstances, an absence of *metameleia* can confirm that the agent has done the right thing. In both of these cases, as I shall argue, *metameleia* carries a specifically moral tone; that is, it can be distinguished from regret for a disadvantageous (but morally neutral) act. The general semantic field of *metameleia* is perhaps best captured by Isaeus 1.19, which claims that all men feel *metameleia* for wrongs to relatives done in anger:

τοῖς μεν γὰρ ἄλλοις κἀκείνων ὧν ἂν ὀργισθέντες τοὺς οἰκείους ἀδικήσωσιν ὕστερον μεταμέλει.[18]

As Dover notes, the inclusion of statements such as this in an agonistic speech cannot be meant to be controversial; rather they are matters about which everyone agrees. Here we are to understand that *metameleia* is a (proper) rethinking of an evil action already completed, and that it is presumed to entail an attempt (or at least a wish) to undo that action. According to Aristotle, where *metameleia* is felt, it tends to eliminate the anger of the victim.[19] *Metameleia* is also the expected result of wrongdoing to those one cares about. And according to the orators, there

[15] The verb *metamelei* is in Greek impersonal; a literal translation of it would be "there is remorse for X because of his behavior Y." I will generally translate the verb in a less ungainly fashion.

[16] *Metalgeo* (feel pain afterward), while it denotes remorse-like feelings, does not appear in extant oratory.

[17] The single exception features the verb *metagignosko* along with *analambano* (take back). See below, 257.

[18] The statement is followed (*de*) by the suggestion, clearly meant to seem preposterous, that Cleonymous, unlike other people (*alloi*), not only does not repent of the foolish results of his anger (disinheriting his relatives), but means to confirm them. The fact that the truth-value of the statement, like so many of its kind, is subject to question, does not change its import.

[19] Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.3.5) notes that people become mild (*praoi*) toward those who agree (*homologousi*) and feel *metameleia* (*metamelomenois*) [that they have done something wrong], for they

is a perceivable difference in kind between people who do wrong (presumably even to those who are not friends or relations) and then feel badly about it, and those who do not. So for instance, the speaker of Demosthenes 18.274 observes that some people do wrong willingly, and against them we have anger and a desire for vengeance; they are contrasted with those who do wrong unwillingly (e.g., out of ignorance, incontinence, or compulsion); these latter are worthy of pardon instead of punishment[20] (ἀδικεί τις ἑκών· ὀργὴν καὶ τιμωρίαν κατὰ τούτου. ἐξήμαρτέ τις ἄκων· συγγνώμην ἀντὶ τῆς τιμωρίας τούτῳ).[21]

Building from this general understanding, we move to an examination of how *metameleia* is used in the orators in specific instances. Isocrates discusses *metameleia*, real or assumed, in two main speeches. The speaker of the *Against Callimachus*, who argues against the legality of the charge Callimachus has brought against him, asserts that Callimachus began to commit offences after the Thirty were expelled: he misbehaved after the time when even those who had earlier transgressed had felt *metameleia* (ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς πρότερον ἡμαρτηκόσι μετέμελεν, 18.18). That is, Callimachus has not the excuse available to some, namely that he acted under compulsion, for he waited until the end of the oligarchy to commit crimes. He was also able to see the physical results of similar acts committed by others, and so could judge of their probable consequences; the excuse of ignorance is also denied to him. His corrupt nature is thus demonstrated, without need for another word.[22] In the *Trapeziticus*, the speaker observes that Satyrus (the ruler of the Bosporus and so of the speaker) felt *metameleia* for his previous behavior (imprisoning the speaker's father because of a misunderstanding) to such an extent that he restored the father to his good graces and made of him an even better friend than before, including marrying his own son to the speaker's sister (17.11). Again there is the thought that *metameleia*, like remorse, will bring with it a desire for reparation, although the reverse is not necessarily true.[23]

Later in that same speech, the defendant Pasion is credited with a *metameleia* that he turns out not to have. The speaker says, ἡγούμενος δ'αὐτῷ μεταμέλειν τῶν πεπραγμένων, συνεχώρουν ("thinking that he *metamelei* his behavior, I

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hold it just that they have pain at their doings, and [therefore] stop being angry. The Greeks seem to have conceived of *metameleia* as a typical result of acting in anger, and expected the angry act itself to cause anger in the other party. See Harris 2001 on the control of anger and Konstan 2003b on Aristotle's concept of anger and its differences from our own.

[20] Aristotle suggests the same distinction, claiming that some do wrong because they think it is right and not wrong, and some through weakness of will (*NE* 3.1). He too feels that the former category is more wicked (7.8–10).

[21] The passage goes on to describe a third category, a man who has neither *adikei* nor *exemarte*, but who has merely not succeeded in his (worthwhile) projects; in this latter category Demosthenes places himself.

[22] At the same time, the judges are allowed to feel as if any aberrations in their own behavior under the Thirty are forgivable.

[23] That is, one may reconsider an action and decide to alter it (on the grounds of expediency, for instance) without feeling any emotion at all.

agreed," 17.18). Pasion was pleading with the speaker to keep his shame private, but this is in fact merely another ploy to deceive him, and Pasion's continued misbehavior shows that his *metameleia* was false. As earlier in the speech, feeling *metameleia* (or pretending to) for an unjust act brings with it a wish for reconciliation. But this example is perhaps even more important than others because the speaker interprets a particular behavior (here apology) as signifying the existence of *metameleia* and so gives us a normative way to discern how that emotion can be attributed to another: although it seemed that Pasion *did* feel *metameleia* for his former behavior, his subsequent actions prove that he did not; on the contrary he continued to behave badly. The continuance of an action is thus plausible evidence that its agent feels no *metameleia* for that action,[24] and in this case the absence of *metameleia* is made to seem even more terrible because it was feigned.

Given the nature of oratorical speeches, it is not surprising that *metameleia* is most noticeable by its absence: a variety of those who have sinned against gods and man show their moral turpitude by *not* feeling *metameleia* for their behavior. Lack of *metameleia*, while clearly a bad thing, is difficult to demonstrate, and so, as in the *Trapeziticus*, the orators most often "prove" its existence by demonstrating the continuity of the evil behavior in question.

So, for instance, a woman in Isocrates' *Aegineticus* who wrongfully claims the inheritance of her half-brother shows no *metameleia* for her misdeeds (19.3):

νῦν δ'αὐτῇ τοσούτου δεῖ μεταμέλειν ὧν εἰς ζῶντ' ἐξήμαρτεν, ὥστε καὶ τεθνεῶτος αὐτοῦ πειρᾶται τήν τε διαθήκην ἄκυρον ἅμα καὶ τὸν οἶκον ἔρημον ποιῆσαι.

But as it is, she lacks so much of feeling *metameleia* for the wrongs she did to him when he was alive, that even now that he is dead she is trying to make his will void and empty his house.

Here, of course, the charge gains poignancy from the fact that her persecutions continue beyond the grave.

Metameleia for an act, then, necessarily includes ceasing from that act. Pseudo-Andocides' speech *Against Alcibiades* (whatever its date)[25] similarly features an Alcibiades who does not feel *metameleia* for his actions but rather continues them: he imprisoned the artist Agatharchus until the latter agreed to paint for him, and when Agatharchus escaped three months later, Alcibiades chased him down and accused him of breach of contract (4.17):

οὕτω δ' ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν, ὥστε προσελθὼν ἐνεκάλει αὐτῷ ὡς ἀδικούμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὧν ἐβιάσατο μετέμελεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὅτι κατέλιπε τὸ ἔργον ἠπείλει.

But so shameless is he [Alcibiades] that going to him [Agatharchus], he accused him of behaving unjustly, and did not *metamelei* his violence against him, but rather threatened him for leaving off from the work.

[24] Compare Arist. *Rhet.* 1.14.4, on those who commit the same fault repeatedly.

[25] Edwards 1995: 131–136 is the most recent discussion of this issue. Like most scholars, he concludes that it is a Hellenistic imitation.

This story is told in order to teach the audience something about Alcibiades: he is the kind of person who wrongs others and does not feel *metameleia* about it (that is, he is not like you and me). The use of *anaischuntos* (shameless) to describe Alcibiades adds an important piece to the puzzle of *metameleia*, for where it had been implicit (as above, in the half-sister's inability to recognize that what she has done is wrong), here the connection between the two is clearly stated. Alcibiades' *anaischuntia* is a character trait; his *anaischuntia* in this situation suggests that he will not refrain from behaving this way in the future.[26] *Anaischuntia* is not an emotion, but rather an insensitivity to feeling the emotion (shame) suitable to the situation; it is, according to the Aristotelean view that we have the right to judge other people by their emotions, blameworthy in itself.[27]

We see shame (*aischune)* connected with *metameleia* in Lysias' speech *Against Simon*, a public suit for intentional wounding (*graphe traumatos ek pronoias*). Like many of the speeches already treated, its subject is an individual who differs from "us" in morality. Its speaker was involved with the prosecutor Simon in a series of wrangles over a boy; he is now defending himself against a charge of assault with homicidal intent, and is arguing both that he was not the instigator of violence and that any violence that did occur was not premeditated, but rather the natural result of amatory squabbles. He displays throughout the speech what we must understand to be conventional morality. He claims first of all to feel shame (*aischunomai*, 3.3) that there is a trial in the first place, preferring to keep his private life out of the courts—unlike Simon, who (it is implied) is *anaischuntos*.[28] He describes the outrageous behavior of Simon, which includes breaking and entering and attempted kidnap of the boy in question (6–7). Simon, however (3.7),

τοσούτου ἐδέησεν αὐτῷ μεταμελῆσαι τῶν ὑβρισμένων, ὥστε ἐξευρὼν οὗ ἐδειπνοῦμεν ἀτοπώτατον πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀπιστότατον ἐποίησεν, εἰ μή τις εἰδείη τὴν τούτου μανίαν.

was so far from *metamelei* his outrageous behavior, that, finding out where we were dining, he did something most strange and unbelievable, at least to anyone who didn't know of his madness.

What he did was to summon the speaker out of the house and attack him. Our speaker again mentions that he is ashamed (*aischunomenos*, 9) about what has happened. After leaving town to escape Simon, the speaker assumes that with the passage of time Simon will have ἐπιλαθέσθαι μὲν τοῦ νεανίσκου, μεταμελῆσαι δὲ τῶν πρότερον ἡμαρτημένων ("both forgotten about the boy and *metamelei* his prior wrongdoing," 3.10), and so returns to Athens, whereupon he is again

[26] Konstan 2003a: 1037 and 1041. See Cairns 1993 and Arist. *Rhet.* 1417a on character as a whole, especially as exhibited in individual actions.

[27] I owe the formulation of this point to one of the readers for the journal. On shame, see Konstan 2003a, who notes that shame is "fundamental to ethical behavior" (1049).

[28] The speaker's shame derives partly from the fact that he is an older man (3.4), and so might seem inappropriately involved with younger men, and partly from the very fact that his personal life is being made public.

assaulted (3.12). The speaker continues to accentuate his own diffident attitude toward the matter: he has since that time avoided conflict with Simon, assuming that Simon and his cronies would be ashamed (*aischunomenous*, 13) of their behavior, and indeed, the others involved in the assaults against the speaker had since apologized (19); the inclusion of this fact reminds us that (public) apology is a desired or typical result of *metameleia*. In contrast to Simon, our speaker is a quiet man who wants to avoid notoriety (30-1). Perhaps most significantly from the normative point of view, the speaker reminds us that cases of this sort (quarrels brought about by amorous rivalry or exacerbated by wine) are generally treated leniently by the courts (3.43):

καὶ γὰρ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ ὅσοι ἐκ μέθης καὶ φιλονικίας ἢ ἐκ παιδιῶν ἢ ἐκ λοιδορίας ἢ περὶ ἑταίρας μαχόμενοι ἕλκος ἔλαβον, εἰ ὑπὲρ τούτων ὧν, ἐπειδὰν βέλτιον φρονήσωσιν, ἅπασι μεταμέλει, οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς μεγάλας καὶ δεινὰς τὰς τιμωρίας ποιήσεσθε, ὥστε ἐξελαύνειν τινὰς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος.

And furthermore, it would be astonishing if you were to punish with severe and surprising punishments (such as driving some of the citizens from their homeland) all those who were wounded when quarreling over wine or because of competitiveness, or about boys or about an insult or about a whore, situations in which everyone, when he thinks better of it, *metamelei*.

The speaker of the *Against Simon* thus sees *metameleia* as a typical result of amatory foolishness, and where *metameleia* is present, harsh punishment is unnecessary: the less said about these situations, the better. The combination of the speaker's own *aischune* and Simon's lack of *metameleia* are designed to make the judges' decision an easy one.

Anaischuntia and *metameleia* are combined in Plato's *Apology* as well, there to stake Socrates' explicitly moral claim that he has done the right thing. His speech, he says, was unsuccessful because of his own lack of daring and shamelessness (*tolmes kai anaischuntias*); he was not willing to behave as people typically do in court. He then asserts (38e):

οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.

Nor do I feel *metameleia* to have defended myself thus, but I would much prefer, speaking so, to die than to live thus [after a different kind of speech].

We may be able to assume from Socrates' parody of it that *timesis*-speeches typically contained a claim of *metameleia*.

The assertion of shamelessness bandied about in the orators[29] is sometimes combined with a charge that someone has not felt *metameleia* in a specific, identifiable incident; in a sense, the lack of *metameleia* has illustrative force for

[29] For just a few examples, see Dem. 41.24, where Spudias feels no shame lying before the people; Dem. 45.50 on Stephanus' shamelessness; Dem. 48.39, 52 on the shamelessness of Olympiodorus; and Dem. 19.199, 210, 222, expressing surprise that with his misdeeds on his conscience, Aeschines can dare to speak in public

the accusation of *anaischuntia*. But there is still a difference between the two. The general Conon feels shame, *kateischunthe*, about the battle of Aegospotami, and so does not sail home, but we are to understand this as a proper feeling, since he later returns to Athens when he is needed (Isoc. 5.62). He is not, significantly, portrayed as feeling *metameleia*, perhaps because Isocrates does not see him as responsible for the outcome of the battle.

While it is sometimes mentioned, *anaischuntia* is more often under the surface of a statement. For instance, in the speech of Isaeus mentioned above, Cleonymus purportedly (and properly) feels remorse for disinheriting his next of kin and so immediately tries to alter his will, but is prevented by the wickedness of those who now stand to inherit. The speaker concludes by saying that even if his opponents can prove that Cleonymus never changed his mind, he is still a closer relation and so should receive the money (1.48–49):

ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα λέγοντες ἀποφαίνωσι καὶ πειρῶνται πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς ἐκεῖνος διέθετο ταύτας τὰς διαθήκας καὶ οὐδὲ πώποτε ὕστερον αὐτῷ μετεμέλησε ... ἀποφαίνωσι μήθ', ὥς ἐγγυτέρω τῷ γένει προσήκουσι μήθ' ὡς οἰκειότερον ἡμῶν πρὸς Κλεώνυμον διέκειντο.

For insofar as they try by saying these things to show and to persuade you that he [Cleonymus] arranged his will so and did not at any later time feel *metameleia* about it, ... they have [still] neither shown that they are more closely related nor that they were more intimate than we with Cleonymus.

The speaker's argument hinges upon the suggestion that Cleonymus was morally obligated to write a different will. He gives Cleonymus the benefit of the doubt, assuming that he felt *metameleia* for disinheriting his relatives, but his main point is that, even if Cleonymus did not, he ought to have done, and so his new will should be invalid.[30]

The instances of *metameleia* that we have heretofore seen all have an explicitly moral component; the speaker in each claims that there is something wrong with what has been done, and that *metameleia* is the normal reaction to it. Those who do not display *metameleia* appropriate to the circumstances mark themselves as different. There are two examples in the orators that appear to contradict this generalization, one on the grounds that the issue is not moral, and the other because the behavior about which *metameleia* is felt is good. These two examples, however, once they are examined, support the definition of *metameleia* offered above. The first is the case of a letter of Isocrates to Philip advising him about his foreign policy. Isocrates mentions that his friends thought his idea was a foolish one, but once they have read his letter, they feel *metameleia* for their mistaken opinion, and agree that they have never done anything so wrong as trying to dissuade him (5.23):

[30] E. M. Harris (2000: 35–39) argues that the speaker is expanding the scope of the law to argue for insanity on the part of testator; this would mean that the will should be discarded.

μετέμελε δ'αὐτοῖς ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων, ὡμολόγουν δὲ μηδενὸς πώποτε τοσοῦτον πράγματος διαμαρτεῖν.

In fact, this "non-moral" example proves the rule: Isocrates uses the verb *metamelei* to underscore just how culpably foolish his friends were; by doubting him, they have done him a grave injustice.

In the second example, the speaker of Isocrates' *Against Callimachus* attempts to illustrate his own character by claiming that, after the battle of Aegospotami, other trierarchs were not only sorry about what they had already spent on the ships, but tried to avoid spending any more. He, on the other hand continued his duties to the state, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνηλωμένων αὐτοῖς μεταμέλον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἀποκρυπτομένων ("although they *metamelei* the money lost and hid the rest [so as not to have to replace the lost ships]," 18.60). Here, *metameleia* is used ironically, to suggest that the other trierarchs are so depraved as to feel *metameleia* over losing money and *not* over failing in their duties.

III

The second broad category into which oratorical *metameleia* falls is perhaps even more interesting than the first: both in forensic speeches and in speeches to the *ekklesia*, the Athenian people are frequently warned of the possibility of *metameleia* if they convict (or free) the defendant or if they fail to follow the plan suggested by the speaker.[31] While *metameleia* involves looking back on the past, it is here projected onto the future to serve as a caution about present behavior. Examples of cautionary *metameleia* can be found in, among others, Andocides' *On the Mysteries*: the speaker claims that if he is found guilty and sentenced to death for profaning the Mysteries, it will soon be too late to *metamelei*: ἐὰν δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τοῖς ἐμοῖς πεισθῆτε, οὐδ' ἂν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑμῖν μεταμελήσῃ (1.149). Reconsideration of the case will come too late, for he will be dead.[32] The speaker of Isocrates' *Against Callimachus* similarly suggests that the judges will *metamelei* if, after causing him to lose his property despite his services to the state, they see his opponent prospering (18.64):

τῷ δ' οὐκ ἂν ὑμῶν μεταμελήσειεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραχρῆμα ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον, εἰ τὸν μὲν συκοφάντην ἴδοιτε πλούσιον γεγενημένον, ἐμὲ δ' ἐξ ὧν ὑπέλιπον λητουργῶν, καὶ τούτων ἐκπεπτωκότα;

Another striking example is Lysias' injunction to the judges that they must *metamelei* their previous decision and deprive Nichomachus of the citizenship

[31] See too Dover 1974: 23–25, on the didactic and often critical role that the orator adopts toward the judges.

[32] It is clear from passages like this that *metameleia* includes an impetus to action. That is, it is never too late to *metamelei* an act, but *metameleia* here will be fruitless because the damage has already been done. This passage confirms Aristotle's notion (above, 245–246, n. 19) that *metameleia* can be seen as punishment for one's mistakes.

rights he has (illicitly) been enjoying: νῦν τοίνυν ὑμῖν μεταμεληsάτω τῶν πεπραγμένων (30.30).

There is a contrary use of *metameleia* in Antiphon 5. Euxitheus reminds the judges that if they later feel *metameleia* over finding him innocent of the murder of Herodes, they can still remedy the situation (5.94):

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐμοὶ πειθομένοις ὑμῖν μεταμελῆσαι ἔστιν, καὶ τούτου φάρμακον τὸ αὖθις κολάσαι, τοῦ δὲ τούτοις πειθομένους ἐξεργάσασθαι ἃ οὗτοι βούλονται οὐκ ἔστιν ἴασις.

If you are persuaded by me about this, it is (still) possible to *metamelei*, and the remedy for this is to punish me later [at a second trial], but if you are persuaded by them and do what they wish, there is no remedy.[33]

As we shall see in section IV, he will argue that the reverse is not the case: sentencing him to death will allow for no (effective) *metameleia*, since it will be too late to repair the wrong done. *Metamelei* is here, I think, extended in meaning by analogy to its opposite. One would not typically feel *metameleia* for neglecting to convict, only for convicting mistakenly.

The first three examples above suggest that *metameleia* is most properly felt for an action causing harm to another that, on later consideration, seems ill-thought. More importantly, a strikingly positive role is laid out for *metameleia* in these cases: it provides the Athenian people with the opportunity to fix their mistakes, even at cost.[34] In each of these cases, it is assumed that the judges may need time to revisit their decisions after the passion of the moment, and in each case a lenient vote will provide them with this time.[35] This differs in form but not in substance from modern behavior, which often focuses on ways of behaving in such a way as to avoid later regret.

The Athenians surely do not need to be reminded that it is all right for them to change their minds; indeed the Athenian *demos* is regularly characterized as indecisive.[36] Isocrates, among others, mentions that Athens regularly feels *metameleia* for past errors of judgment (15.19):

[33] See too Antiphon 5.91 with discussion below.

[34] There are a number of other passages that do not use *metamelei* but which support this positive view of reconsideration: Lysias (19.53) insists that it is a mark of the best and wisest men to be willing to change one's mind (*metagignosko*); Antiphon (2.4.12) assures the judges that they will soon reconsider (*metanoeo*) having condemned him; Demosthenes (*Ex.* 49.2) claims that it is only fair to have a chance to reconsider one's decisions (*metabouleuo*). More specific examples include the Thebans in Dem. 18.153, who properly change their minds (*metagignosko*); the Macedonian king Amyntas, who reconsiders a decision and thereby keeps his throne (*metagignosko*, Isoc. 6.46); and Dem. 26.17, which claims that the people are delighted to reconsider (*metanoeo*) the legislation of Aristogeiton now that he is no longer in favor—and this willingness to change the laws is (here) envisioned as a good thing. See below, section VI, on words similar to *metamelei*, where this vocabulary is discussed in greater detail.

[35] I owe the formulation of this point to a reader for the journal.

[36] See, for example, Isoc. 8.52, which complains that the Athenians disapprove of what they have voted the previous day, and Isoc. 18.30 on the importance of sticking to one's decisions.

οἶμαι δ' ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι τῇ πόλει πολλάκις οὕτως ἤδη μετεμέλησε τῶν κρίσεων τῶν μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ μὴ μετ' ἐλέγχου γενομένων, ὥστ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον διαλιποῦσα παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐξαπατησάντων δίκην λαβεῖν ἐπεθύμησε.

I think that you are not ignorant that this city has often *metamelei* its judgments pronounced in anger and without proof such that, not much later, it has wanted to punish those who deceived it.

Given the positive role for *metameleia* in the formulation of moderate sentencing seen above, it is perhaps not surprising that there is only a single assurance in the extant oratorical corpus that the people will *not* feel *metameleia* about making a certain decision, especially given the frequency of this kind of statement in modern injunctions ("you won't be sorry," etc.).[37] Andocides assures the Athenians that they will not be sorry about making peace with Sparta: ψηφίσασθε δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν ὑμῖν μηδέποτε μεταμελήσει ("Vote for this, which you will never *metamelei*," 3.41). I read this as a further indication of the specifically moral tone of *metameleia*.

At the same time, there *are* assertions that the people have been content with their decisions; *metameleia* is sometimes used here contrafactually. For instance, the speaker of Demosthenes 19.54 asserts that some people thought the Athenians felt *metameleia* about making peace with Philip, but they hadn't: ἀλλὰ καὶ μεταμέλειν ὑμῖν ᾠοντό τινες πεποιημένοις τὴν πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνην; Isocrates asserts that Callimachus' behavior would be acceptable only if the city had *metamelei* declaring an amnesty: εἰ μὲν ἑώρα μεταμέλον τῇ πόλει τῶν πεπραγμένων (18.21). Lysias (26.20) reminds the people that they have voted honors to good citizens and not felt *metameleia*: καὶ οὐδέποτε αὐτοῖς μετεμέλησεν. And Demosthenes (26.10) assures the people that they have not *metamelei* passing laws that stipulate partial *atimia* for prosecutors who fail to gain one-fifth of the vote in certain charges: οὐδεπώποτ' οὔθ' ὑμῖν οὔτε τοῖς προγόνοις μετεμέλησεν. The use of *metamelei* in these cases suggests that they are concerned with morality; in these particular instances, the people have made the correct decisions and so have not needed to revisit them (or, if they have revisited those decisions, they have remained convinced of their correctness). The second two examples extend the meaning of *metameleia* ironically (cf. above, 252).

Perhaps more instructive is the contrast between these and other passages that speak of repentance or regret in a more general way, but without the notion of *metameleia*. For instance, Andocides (2.6) claims that those who make fewest mistakes are the most fortunate, but those who regret them soonest are the most sensible: εἰσὶν εὐτυχέστατοι μὲν οἱ ἐλάχιστα ἐξαμαρτάνοντες, σωφρονέστατοι δὲ οἳ ἂν τάχιστα μεταγιγνώσκωσι.[38] The context of the passage makes it clear that making mistakes is a part of being human, and so is not liable to any censure, provided that the mistakes are quickly repaired. Demosthenes

[37] Our own tendency to assure one another that a certain path will not be regretted hints at a discomfort with the notion of regret that Landman (1994) sees as characteristic of Western society as a whole.

[38] See section IV for a fuller discussion of *metagignosko* and other relatives of *metameleia*.

says the same thing using a variety of verbs: ἂν δ' ἄρ' ἕκαστα λογιζομένοις ἀλλοιότερος φανῇ, πρὶν ἁμαρτεῖν μεταβουλευσαμένους, τοῖς ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν χρήσασθαι ("Change your plans if they seem wrong," *Ex.* 32.4.6); πολλάκις ἤδη πολλοὺς μετεγνωκότας ("Many times have men changed their minds," *Ex.* 5.3.4). The difference between these passages and those that use *metamelei* is that the former are also future-oriented and general cases, so the focus on the other that I have seen in *metameleia* is necessarily absent.[39] Another possible difference is that some of them suggest that if a decision is altered quickly, it will prevent *metameleia*. The fact that some of the passages cited above are Demosthenic *exordia* (the generic introductions to speeches not yet written) means that we cannot know the context, but also suggests that the rethinking of a publicly made decision entailed no shame and needed no lengthy justification.

At times, the audience is reminded of its regret over a specific past choice as a way of advising caution in present circumstances: among these, the decision to punish with death all the commanders at Arginousae is a key but not solitary instance.[40] Athens, in fact, is characterized as (over-)frequently regretting its decisions and not only in the orators. So, for instance, Antiphon mentions the wrongful putting to death of the Hellenotamiai for embezzlement (5.69–70, not otherwise known), in order to make the judges think twice before sentencing him. The Mytilenean debate, perhaps the most well-known example of an official decision reconsidered, is also mentioned in oratory as an example of Athens' rethinking of foreign policy.[41] Unfortunately, the orators do not treat collective past *metameleia* with enough frequency to warrant detailed discussion here.[42]

IV

So far, we have seen that (an absence of) *metameleia* is used by the orators to arouse indignation in their audience: there are certain actions that should cause *metameleia*, and when they do not, it may be concluded that their agents are lacking in conscience. Other actions are seen as unworthy of censure even if they might profitably be reconsidered, or are actually disadvantageous to the agent (but morally neutral); we would not expect these to cause *metameleia* if *metameleia* is even roughly equivalent to our "remorse." This section, then, will explore words related to *metameleia* to determine if there is indeed a difference between them in terms of morality.

Metagignosko indicates a simple change of mind, sometimes with regret and sometimes without. I cite four examples: Andocides 1.140, which urges its

[39] I owe the formulation of this point to a reader for the journal.

[40] Lysias (14.25–29) discusses the case of Archedamus, who urged prosecution of the generals; see especially 29, where the MSS have *metamelei* (although modern commentators print *melei* instead).

[41] At Antiphon 5.79, it is called a *hamartia*.

[42] See Ober 1998: 94–104 for a recent discussion of the Mytilenean debate that engages with many of the issues raised here. I hope to discuss Athenian collective *metameleia* (primarily in the historians) in a subsequent study.

audience not to change its mind (*metagnote*) and strip the city of her reputation (see section III on admonitory statements of this kind); Isocrates 6.46, which states that the Macedonian king Amyntas had planned to escape when he lost a battle, but afterwards, *metagnous* his decision, won back the territory he had lost; Demosthenes 18.153, which explains that the Thebans discovered a trick of Philip's and so immediately changed their minds (*metegnosan*) and enlisted on the Athenian side; and Demosthenes' second letter, which warns the Athenians that they will seem guilty of injustice if they do not change their verdict (*metagnonai*) about him (*Ep.* 2.8). Demosthenes here focuses on the external appearances that will result from a judicial decision, rather than the judges' own feelings, so the simple *metagignosko* is more suitable. These examples are typical insofar as the speakers approve of some of the changes of mind (the second, third, and fourth), and disapprove of others (the first). They are also typical in that no time is specified for the change; *metagnosis* is sometimes in the future and sometimes in the past.

Two further examples of *metagignosko*, more closely related to *metameleia*, should help to illustrate the differences between them. Later in life, Isocrates himself claims to rethink what he has previously written about the Lacedaimonians, but the verb, significantly, is *metagignosko* and not *metamelei* because he acknowledges no moral error; he remains convinced that his opinions were correct (12.232). So too in Isaeus 2, the adopted son and so heir of a certain Menecles tells us that his father did not rethink the adoption, although he lived another twenty-three years (2.15):

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, τοσούτῳ ὄντι, οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνος μετέγνω τῶν πεπραγμένων ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖσθαι ὅτι ἦν ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένος.

In all that time, he did not reconsider (*metegno*) his action, because it was agreed by everyone that he had thought about the matter correctly.

Indeed, Menecles should not change his behavior, for he has been behaving in a manner appropriate to a man with no son.[43]

Metanoia or its verb *metanoeo* is similar in meaning to *metagignosko* but appears far less frequently. Antiphon (2.4.12) urges the judges μὴ μετανοήσαντες τὴν ἁμαρτίαν γνῶτε· ἀνίατος γὰρ ἡ μετάνοια τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν ("do not recognize your mistake looking back on it; for afterthought in cases like these does no good"). *Metanoeo*, however, may differ from *metagignosko* insofar as the speaker seems usually to suggest that the item under reconsideration is a mistake rather than simply a decision.

Antiphon's *On the Murder of Herodes* contains all three of the verbs so far discussed. Euxitheus urges the judges to make their decision carefully, and, since

[43] See too Isoc. 6.70, which insists that even if the other Greeks should behave unjustly to Athens, the speaker would not *metagnoien* his opinion, presumably because he is still convinced of its fitness. In neither of these cases is *metameleia* conceived of as the proper reaction.

he will be tried in a second case, to suspend the sentence of death until that later trial (91):

καὶ μὴν εἰ δέοι ἁμαρτεῖν τι, τὸ ἀδίκως ἀπολῦσαι ὁσιώτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ δικαίως ἀπολέσαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁμάρτημα μόνον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον καὶ ἀσέβημα. ἐν ᾧ χρὴ πολλὴν πρόνοιαν ἔχειν, μέλλοντας ἀνήκεστον ἔργον ἐργάζεσθαι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἀκεστῷ πράγματι καὶ ὀργῇ χρησαμένους καὶ διαβολῇ πιθομένους ἔλαττόν ἐστιν ἐξαμαρτεῖν· μεταγνοὺς γάρ <τις> ἔτι ἂν ὀρθῶς βουλεύσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνηκέστοις πλέον βλάβος τὸ μετανοεῖν καὶ γνῶναι ἐξημαρτηκότας. ἤδη δέ τισιν ὑμῶν καὶ μετεμέλησεν ἀπολωλεκόσι. καίτοι ὅπου ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐξαπατηθεῖσι μετεμέλησεν, ἦ καὶ πάνυ τοι χρῆν τούς γε ἐξαπατῶντας ἀπολωλέναι.

And if it is necessary to make a mistake somewhere, it would be more proper to free someone unjustly than to sentence him without justice. For the first is a mistake alone, but the second is an impiety also. You, who are about to do a deed that is irremediable, must have great forethought in the present circumstances. For, in a case which is remediable, making a mistake, either out of anger or because you have been persuaded by slander, is less [serious], because someone can still change his mind (*metagignosko*) and decide correctly about the matter. But in the case that the harm is irremediable, it is more [serious] to reconsider (*metanoeo*) and know that you have made a mistake. Before now, some of you have felt *metameleia* about having killed people. And yet, when those of you who had been deceived felt *metameleia*, certainly those who had deceived you should have been killed.

The differences between the three are here clearly illustrated: *metagignosko* simply involves a change of mind, *metanoeo* is a more serious reconsideration (especially where there is some harm done), and *metamelei* is a result of *metanoeo*, specifically the realization, upon reconsideration, that one has made a serious mistake and that it cannot be fixed.

The verb *metabouleuo*, unlike *metagignosko*, seems to mean simply the neutral "change one's mind" without an accompanying notion of mistake or regret, although Demosthenes sometimes suggests that *metabouleuo* is itself suspicious.[44] Demosthenes (5.2) claims that Athens debates *after* making decisions (*bouleuesthai meta* . . .). He also observes that the people are foolish to change their minds: "rethinking the same thing" (*auton metabouleuomenoi*, *Ex.* 35.1.6). Demosthenes' letter to the *boule* explains that they can make their opponents change their minds (*metagnonai*, *Ep.* 1.9) by behaving differently, while elsewhere he discusses changing one's mind frequently (*metabouleuesthai pollakis*, 15) about matters involving war; this change (*metagnosis*) is explicitly termed dangerous in contrast with other kinds of reconsiderations. *Metabouleuo* by itself, then, has little in common with *metameleia* except insofar as each wishes for some difference; even there, *metabouleuo* regularly implies that the change of opinion will alter the world

[44] But see above, 254 on *Ex.* 32.4, and 252, n. 34 on *Ex.* 49.2, where *metabouleuo* is offered as a good thing.

in some way, where *metameleia* seems more often to presume that alteration is impossible.[45]

In the orators, then, a change of mind divorced from a moral component is *not* regularly expressed with *metameleia*. Yet, although *metameleia* is narrow and deals only with moral issues, it is by no means the only way to express morality. Antiphon 1, for instance, engages with many of the same issues often associated with *metameleia*, but with an entirely different vocabulary. The speaker there accuses his stepmother of poisoning her husband (she convinces his friend's mistress to administer the poison), and he describes her behavior as *aboulos* and *atheos*, without a second thought and godless (23). The description of her as *aboulos* sets up the lengthier accusation that her own lack of conscience should cause the judges to feel no scruple in putting her to death (27).[46] The orator Aristogeiton is an offender of a similar degree of egregiousness: Pseudo-Demosthenes claims that in his case, punishment has no effect, since after being punished, he commits the same crimes (in this case, defaulting on debts, 25.94). He has neither remorse nor morality.[47]

The case of Demosthenes 21 also seems to treat of a moral case without the use of the word *metameleia*.[48] In a speech which attacks the wealthy Meidias for religious impiety (he apparently struck Demosthenes during the tragic festival of 351/50), Demosthenes depicts Meidias not only as being unrepentant of his previous offences, but as having committed further offences: ἀντὶ τοῦ ταῦτ' ἀναλαμβάνειν καὶ μεταγιγνώσκειν, πολλῷ δεινότερ' ὕστερον ἄλλα προσεξεργάζοιτο (109). Although *metameleia* is not here used, the two verbs *analambano* and *metagignosko* taken together seem to be roughly equivalent to it; the first involves the wish to "take back" or repair the harm done (the "other-related" piece of *metameleia*), while the second is a recognition that one has made a poor choice (the "self-related" piece).

V

We can observe from this description a kind of popular morality: certain sorts of things, even without a knowledge of their consequences, are simply not acceptable, and when the typical person (i.e., the dikast, the Athenian citizen) hears about them, he will also expect to hear that the agent of them has felt

[45] I have chosen not to treat such verbs as *metaballo* and *metapeitho* because, although they too involve a change of mind, they are very infrequently connected to emotional content.

[46] Extant oratory does not contain the opposite notion that judges might or should have scruples about putting to death someone who did show remorse for a crime; this is likely because oratorical speeches never admit guilt (but see above, section II).

[47] See too Konstan 2003a (cited above, 244, n. 14) on *anaischuntia* as suggesting that an agent will commit the same act again.

[48] For a recent discussion of the question whether the speech was ever delivered, see Harris 1989 with bibliography; he argues that it was. MacDowell (1990: 23–28) is agnostic.

metameleia. In the majority of the cases, *metameleia* or its absence is not mentioned, but sometimes it is specifically excluded; in those cases we may assume that the speaker is commenting on the agent's morality as a whole. While other verbs (notably *metanoeo*) can have a moral tone, they do not unambiguously do so.

The question can now be directly addressed: can *metameleia* in the orators reliably be interpreted as remorse? It seems that it can: *metameleia* covers the general circumstances of an action that is now regretted but also carries something very close to the specific moral tone of our "remorse," with the more general "regret" usually taken care of by *metagignosko* or, sometimes, *metanoeo*. In all of the varieties of extant speeches, there is a significant place for remorse or, more usually, for its absence. The standard oratorical accusations of shamelessness and the like sometimes include specific instances of regrettable behavior which can be seen as indicative of the immorality of the opponent, particularly when the speaker can claim that he has not regretted his own actions. The emotion of remorse, then, does exist in the orators and fulfills two significant functions: it serves as an indicator of individual morality, claiming that there are things about which people ought to feel badly, and that there is something wrong when they do not; and also, more specifically, it serves as a warning to the Athenian citizen body to consider carefully the decisions it makes.[49]

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